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A CRITIQUE OF THE PROPOSED WEST
VIRGINIA CRIMINAL CODE*
ROBERT BATEY** and JAY MONTGOMERY BROWN***
I. INTRODUCTION
The proposed West Virginia Criminal Code' will be introduced
in the 1979 legislative session. The drafters, a subcommittee of the
Joint Committee on Government and Finance, have requested
comments, criticisms, and suggestions to be considered for incor-
poration in the final draft.2 This article is a response to that solici-
tation.'
Those who favor codification of the substantive law of crimes
frequently complain that it is hard to demonstrate the attraction
of codification but easy to show its disadvantages. Codification
results in loss of common-law flexibility and loss of the stability
that is obtained by defining criminal behavior in terms refined by
centuries of interpretation. Proponents of codification find it diffi-
cult to explain the gains which offset those losses, yet these propo-
* Many of the arguments made in this article were first expressed at a seminar
held in June, 1977, at Charleston, West Virginia. The authors would like to thank
the sponsor of that seminar, the Mountain State Bar Association, for the opportun-
ity to comment on the proposed criminal code. Neither the Mountain State Bar
Association nor any of its members bears any responsibility for the arguments
presented in this article.
** Assistant Professor, Stetson University College of Law; Assistant Professor,
West Virginia University College of Law, 1975-77. B.A., Yale, 1970; J.D., University
of Virginia, 1974; LL.M., University of Illinois, 1976.
*** Private practice, Fairmont, West Virginia. A.B., West Virginia Wesleyan
College, 1974; J.D., West Virginia University, 1977.
' SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL LAWS OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
AND FINANCE, WEST VIRGINIA LEGISLATURE, FIRST REVISED DRAFT, WEST VIRGINIA
CRIMINAL CODE (1976) [hereinafter cited as WEST VIRGINIA CRIMINAL CODE].
2 Morgantown Dominion-Post, Nov. 18, 1977, at 14-A, col. 1.
3 Although the authors generally favor codification of common-law crimes,
they have taken this opportunity to demonstrate some of the inadequacies of the
proposed West Virginia Criminal Code in the hope that their comments, criticisms,
and suggestions will be incorporated into the final draft.
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nents are convinced that codification of the criminal law does
achieve more than it sacrifices. According to them, criminal law
in West Virginia resembles a huge castle. Hundreds of years ago,
the castle was nothing more than a rude building composed of a
few simple rooms; time, however, brought both new construction
and renovation. Rooms were added as the needs and capacities of
the inhabitants grew, and when additions could not be built, the
occupants put old rooms to new uses. The result was a house woe-
fully deficient in design. Lacking an overall blueprint, generations
of designers failed to coordinate the functions of the various rooms
and produced a structure so haphazard as to be uninhabitable.
West Virginia criminal laws grew as that castle grew-without
any overall design. Proponents of criminal law codification now
want to move out of the castle and into a modern home-a home
whose floorplan coordinates all the rooms in a sensible, rational
way.
As shown by the analogy, the principal achievement of codifi-
cation is that it provides an opportunity to coordinate the mass of
criminal statutes into a coherent whole and makes the relationship
between various areas of the law easier to understand. The analogy
also suggests two means of evaluating any proposed codification:
one can either examine the general provisions (the blueprint) of the
proposed code to judge whether it provides a coherent whole, or one
can look to the specific provisions (the rooms) to insure that they
are coordinated in a practical and efficient manner.
II. GENERAL PROVISIONS
The general provisions of a criminal code can facilitate the
coordination of the specific provisions of that code. For example,
if the general provisions define the mental requirements for all
criminal offenses in terms of a few basic concepts, then the confus-
ing array of mental requirements dictated by the common law
could be avoided. It is important to analyze how successfully the
general provisions of the West Virginia Criminal Code fulfill the
promise of coherent codification and how sensibly and rationally
the specific provisions of the proposed code are coordinated.
Articles 1 through 4 and 12 contain the general provisions of
the proposed code. Article 1 sets out general definitions and estab-
lishes certain procedural rules, including rules governing burdens
of proof and the use of inferences. Article 2 adopts minimum re-
quirements for criminal liability and defines accessorial liability.
Article 3 recognizes various general defenses, such as self-defense,
[Vol. 80
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insanity, and entrapment. Article 4 concerns the inchoate offen-
ses-attempt, solicitation, and conspiracy-and article 12 deals
with sentencing.'
The provisions of article 2 regarding general principles of lia-
bility demonstrate the advances which codification can make as
well as the inadequacies which codification can create. In defining
the minimum requirements for criminal liability, article 2 adopts
many of the reforms suggested by the drafters of the Model Penal
Code but omits a vital rule of statutory construction found in the
model code. This omission produces a number of anomalous re-
sults when the general provisions of the proposed code are applied
to its specific provisions.
One of the most important innovations proposed in the Model
Penal Code was a simplification of the mental requirements for
criminal liability.' Where the common law of crimes employs a
large number of terms to define the mens rea necessary for com-
mission of all the various offenses,I the Model Penal Code uses only
four: "purposely," "knowingly," "recklessly," and "negligently. 7
The proposed West Virginia Criminal Code also contains specific provisions
regarding offenses against the person (article 5), offenses against property (article
6), offenses involving theft, forgery, or fraud (articles 7-8), and offenses against
public administration, order, health, or morality (articles 9-11). In addition, articles
13 through 14 define criminal contempt and criminal nuisance, respectively.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Official Draft, 1962).
Current West Virginia criminal statutes, which adopt the common-law defi-
nitions of most crimes, indicate the variety of mental requirements possible. The
defendant must have acted "wilfully" to have committed one crime, W. VA. CODE
§ 61-3A-1(1) (1977 Replacement Vol.) (shoplifting), "fraudulently" to have com-
mitted another, id. § 61-3-20 (1977 Replacement Vol.) (embezzlement), and
"maliciously" to have committed a third, id. § 61-2-9 (1977 Replacement Vol.)
(assault). Other criminal statutes are drafted in terms of intent, id. § 61-3-11 (1977
Replacement Vol.) (burglary), knowledge, id. § 61-3-18 (1977 Replacement Vol.)
(fraudulent use of credit cards), and recklessness, id. § 17C-5-1 (1974 Replacement
Vol.) (vehicular homicide). Many statutes do not specify any mental requirement.
Id. §§ 61-8B-3 to -8 (1977 Replacement Vol.) (sexual assault, sexual abuse).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (Official Draft, 1962). One acts purposely when
it is his "conscious object" to engage in the conduct proscribed. Id. § 2.02(2)(a).
To act knowingly, one need not desire that his actions result in criminal conduct;
simple awareness that a criminal result is "practically certain" is sufficient to meet
the requirement. Id. § 2.02(2)(b). Recklessness and negligence involve running a
risk that one's action might constitute the prohibited behavior. In either case,
running the risk must be a "gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a
law-abiding person would observe"; the difference between acting recklessly and
acting negligently is that the reckless actor is "conscious" that he is running a risk
while the negligent actor "should be aware" of the risk but is not. Id. § 2.02(2)(c)-
(d).
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The drafters of the model code found that these four terms, used
singly or in combination, could replace all of the others.
The proposed West Virginia Criminal Code follows this aspect
of the Model Penal Code with only a few variations: "purposely"
becomes "intentionally" and "negligently" becomes "with crimi-
nal negligence"' under the proposed code. Accepting this recom-
mendation of the drafters of the Model Penal Code simplifies the
treatment of mens rea in the proposed code. The definition of
murder, for example, avoids that opaque concept "malice afore-
thought"' and uses instead intention and recklessness.'" A mur-
WEST VIRGINIA CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 1, § 61-2-2 provides that
[i]n this criminal code, unless a different meaning plainly is re-
quired, the following definitions apply:
(1) "Intentionally." A person acts intentionally with respect
to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense
when his conscious objective is to cause such result or to engage
in such conduct.
(2) "Knowingly." A person acts knowingly with respect to
conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an
offense when he is aware that his conduct is of such nature or that
such circumstance exists.
(3) "Recklessly." A person acts recklessly with respect to a
result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an
offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substan-
tial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such
circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree
that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the stan-
dard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the
situation. A person who creates such a risk but is unaware thereof
solely by reason of voluntary intoxication also acts recklessly with
respect thereto.
(4) "Criminal negligence." A person acts with criminal negli-
gence with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a
statute defining an offense when he fails to perceive a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such cir-
cumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that
failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the stan-
dard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situa-
tion.
"Though murder is frequently defined as the unlawful killing of another
'living human being' with 'malice aforethought,' in modern times the latter phrase
does not even approximate its literal meaning. Hence it is preferable not to rely
upon that misleading expression for an understanding of murder ... ."W. LAFAvE
& A. Scor, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw § 67, at 528 (1972).
W WEST VIRGINIA CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 1, § 61-5-2(a) provides that
[a] person is guilty of murder when:
(1) With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes
[Vol. 80
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der statute explicitly relying on the concept of malice aforethought
can be construed only on the basis of prior cases interpreting that
term-that is, only on the basis of prior murder cases. When a
murder statute uses the general terms "intentionally" and
"recklessly," however, a court construing those terms can rely not
only on prior murder cases but also on all prior cases interpreting
these terms as used in the definitions of other crimes. In this way,
the use of general provisions in criminal-law codification allows
each provision defining a specific crime to draw strength from all
of the other specific provisions.
By using concepts developed in the drafting of the Model
Penal Code, the proposed West Virginia Criminal Code makes
important advances over the current criminal statutes. Unfortun-
ately, fidelity t6 the Model Penal Code is imperfect: although the
proposed West Virginia Criminal Code adopts a simplified set of
mental requirements, it omits an important provision of the Model
Penal Code concerning the interpretation of criminal statutes
which specify no mental requirement. This omission produces
problems of statutory construction throughout the proposed code.
The section of the Model Penal Code defining the four mens
rea levels establishes various rules for construing statutory provi-
sions which contain no indication of the level of culpability re-
quired. Unless a contrary intent plainly appears, some mental re-
quirement must be read into any criminal provision;" in other
words, there is a presumption against liability without fault which
can be overcome only by a clear expression of legislative intent.
The Model Penal Code also includes a weaker presumption against
the death of such person or of a third person; except that in any
prosecution a person shall not be guilty under this subsection if:
(i) He acted under the influence of extreme emotional dis-
turbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse,
the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint
of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances
as the defendant believed them to be. However, nothing contained
in this section shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or
preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the first degree or any
other crime; or
(2) Under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference
to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a
grave risk of death to another person and thereby causes the death
of another person.
MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(1), .05 (Official Draft, 1962).
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criminal liability based on negligence. A statutory provision which
is silent with respect to mens rea must be read to require that the
defendant committed the prohibited conduct "purposely, know-
ingly, or recklessly."'" The legislature must use the language of
negligence in order to make purely negligent behavior criminal.
The proposed West Virginia Criminal Code errs by not adopt-
ing these two rules of construction. Although provisions creating a
presumption against liability without fault do appear in the pro-
posed code,"' there is no mention of a presumption against liability
based solely on negligence. Consequently, under the proposed code
a criminal provision which is silent with respect to the mental state
required for commission of the crime may be interpreted to require
only negligence in the commission of the prohibited acts.
The sexual misconduct provision of the proposed code is an
instance of its failure to specify a mental requirement. The defini-
tional subsection reads: "A person is guilty of sexual misconduct
when he engages in sexual intercourse with another person without
the latter's consent."" Under the rules of construction adopted in
the Model Penal Code, a court construing this provision must re-
quire the prosecution to prove not only that the defendant engaged
in sexual intercourse without consent, but also that he did so inten-
12 Id. § 2.02(3).
" WEST VMGINIA CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 1, §§ 61-2-3(2), -5. Section 61-2-
3(2) establishes the following minimum requirements for criminal liability:
A person is not guilty of a criminal offense unless:
He has engaged in ... conduct intentionally, knowingly, recklessly
or with criminal negligence, as the law may require, with respect to each
element of the offense, except that this requirement does not apply to any
offense which imposes absolute liability, as defined in section five of this
article.
Section 61-2-5 defines liability without fault as follows:
(a) If an offense or some material element thereof does not require a
culpable mental state on the part of the actor, such offense is one of
"strict liability."
(b) A person may be guilty of an offense involving strict liability only
when:
(f) The offense is a violation and no particular culpable men-
tal state is specifically designated within or necessarily required by
the definition of the offense; or
(2) The offense is defined by a statute other than this criminal
code and the statute clearly indicates a legislative purpose to im-
pose absolute liability for the conduct described.
" Id. § 61-5-38(a).
[Vol. 80
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tionally, knowingly, or recklessly. Under the proposed West Vir-
ginia Criminal Code, a court would be free to construe the statute
to require only a showing that the defendant negligently engaged
in sexual intercourse without consent. A defendant who should
have been aware that there was no consent, but who was not, could
be branded a criminal and thrown into jail for as long as a year,15
even though in the circumstances, as he perceived them, there was
not even the risk of wrongdoing. Such a penalty for a negligent act'6
,Id. §§ 61-5-38(b), -12-9(b)(1).
I Many other examples could be offered. The proposed code fails to specify
the mens rea requirement for each of the following offenses: one form of terroristic
threatening, id. § 61-5-16(a)(1); sexual assault in the first, second, and third de-
grees, id. §§ 61-5-32(a), -33(a), -34(a); sexual abuse in the first, second, and third
degrees, id. §§ 61-5-35 (a), -36(a), -37(a); one form of criminal mischief in the third
degree, id. § 61-6-11(a)(2); one form of theft of services, id. § 61-7-5 (a)(3); unlawful
compensation for past official behavior, id. § 61-9-14(a); misuse of confidential
information, id. § 61-9-19(a); unlawful surveillance in the first degree, id. § 61-10-
21(a); possession of weapons while intoxicated, id. § 61-10-34(a); improperly fur-
nishing firearms to a minor, id. § 61-10-42(a); prostitution, id. § 61-11-23(a); and
unlawfully dealing with a child, id. § 61-11-41(a)(3).
Furthermore, a number of offenses in the proposed code specify mental require-
ments in an ambiguous fashion. An example is the custodial interference provision
which provides that
[a] person is guilty of custodial interference when, knowing that he has
no legal right to do so, he takes, entices or keeps from lawful custody any
incompetent or other person entrusted by authority of law to the custody
of another person or to an institution.
Id. § 61-5-28(a). Although it is clear that the prosecution must prove that the
defendant knew he had no legal right to "take, entice, or keep" the individual whose
custody is interfered with, the level of culpability which the prosecution must prove
with regard to that taking, enticement, or keeping is far from clear. If simple
negligence constitutes sufficient culpability, then the custodial interference statute
would punish a negligent taking by one who knows he has no legal right to take.
Other proposed provisions which, like the custodial interference statute, can
be read to penalize negligence include receiving stolen property, id. § 61-7-10(a);
possession of a forgery device, id. § 61-8-8(a); misapplication of entrusted property,
id. § 61-8-29(a); some forms of falsely reporting an incident, id. §§ 61-9-6(2), -6(3),
-6(5); one form of tampering with public records, id. § 61-9-8(a)(3); receiving or
granting unlawful compensation for assisting private interests in public matters, id.
§ 61-9-13(a); unlawful gift to public servants, id. § 61-9-15(a); soliciting unlawful
compensation, id. § 61-9-16(a); escape in the first, second, and third degrees, id.
§§ 61-9-20(5), -21(a), -22(a), -23(a); perjury in the first and second degree and false
swearing, id. §§ 61-9-37(a), -38(a), -39(a); tampering with physical evidence, id. §
61-9-55(a); possession of an eavesdropping device, id. § 61-10-20(a); tampering with
private communications, id. § 61-10-23(a); possession of gambling records in the
first and second degree and possession of a gambling device, id. §§ 61-11-15(a), -
16(a), -18(a); permitting a minor to disseminate pornography, id. § 61-11-33(a);
bigamy, id. §§ 61-11-36(a), -36(b); and incest, id. § 61-11-37(a).
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is possible because the proposed code fails to include a presump-
tion against criminal liability for negligence. Having chosen to
follow the example of the model code in simplifying the types of
mens rea requirements, the drafters of the proposed code
failed-either by design or through neglect-to follow that exam-
ple completely; the result, with regard to minimum levels of culpa-
bility, is a disaster.
Article 2 of the proposed code has some pluses to offset its
minuses, but article 1 displays the proposed West Virginia Crim-
inal Code at its worst. Article 1 contains carelessly drafted provi-
sions dealing with burdens of proof and the use of inferences
against the defendant which raise a welter of constitutional ques-
tions. By forcing the courts to construe some criminal statutes to
the very brink of constitutionality, these provisions will complicate
many cases. The result of codification in this respect will be confu-
sion, not clarity and rationality.
The difficulties with regard to burdens of proof in the proposed
code stem from a misreading of the model code, the basis for much
of the language in the proposed code. The Model Penal Code div-
ides the burden-of-proof problem into two subsidiary questions: (1)
who has the burden of first producing evidence with regard to a
particular issue? (2) who has the burden of persuading the finder
of fact with regard to that issue? If the issue concerns any of the
basic elements of the offense-the prohibited conduct, the re-
quired mental state, or a jurisdictional prerequisite to prosecu-
tion-the Model Penal Code places on the prosecution both the
burden of initially producing evidence and the burden of ulti-
mately persuading the jury." If the issue relates to any matter of
mitigation, the model code allocates the burden of production
sometimes to the prosecution and sometimes to the defendant.
This allocation is accomplished through use of the terms "defense"
and "affirmative defense." If the model code denominates any set
of excusing or justifying circumstances an "affirmative defense,"
then the defendant bears the burden of initially introducing evi-
dence tending to establish those circumstances. 8 If the term
"defense" is used without any attribution, the prosecution has the
burden of first producing evidence which negates the defense.,'
," MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 1.12(1), .13(9) (Official Draft, 1962). The jury must
be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt.
" Id. §§ 1.12, .13(9).
, Id. For example, § 2.04 of the Model Penal Code defines ignorance or mistake
[Vol. 80
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Thus clarifying the burden-of-production question, the Model
Penal Code in addition establishes that the prosecution must dis-
prove all defenses, affirmative or otherwise, beyond a reasonable
doubt-unless some specific provision clearly places on the defen-
dant the burden of ultimately persuading the jury."0
In the provisions defining specific offenses, the proposed West
Virginia Criminal Code resembles the Model Penal Code. Where
the model code establishes a defense or an affirmative defense, the
proposed code will most likely establish a defense or an affirmative
defense."' This would not be remarkable if the proposed code de-
fined "defense" and "affirmative defense" as the Model Penal
Code does. Provisions in the Model Penal Code and the proposed
West Virginia Criminal Code which are identical in language, how-
ever, are not identical in meaning-a fact which the drafters of the
proposed code seem not to have noted. Where the Model Penal
Code uses the "defense"-"affirmative defense" distinction to allo-
cate the burden of production, the proposed West Virginia Crimi-
nal Code uses the distinction to allocate the burden of persuasion:
although the prosecution must establish beyond a reasonable
as a defense. Id. § 2.04(1). Consequently, should an unfortunate prosecutor fail in
his case-in-chief either to prove or to imply that the defendant knew what he was
doing, a directed acquittal would be proper.
Id. §§ 1.12, .13(9). In this fashion, the drafters of the Model Penal Code
signify the consequences of the terms "defense" and "affirmative defense." If
"defense" is used, the prosecution must be the first to raise the issue and must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense does not apply to the facts at
hand. If "affirmative defense" is used and the provision is silent as to burden of
persuasion, then the defendant must bring the issue into the case; but, once he has
done so, the prosecution must disprove the affirmative defense beyond a reasonable
doubt. The defendant has the burden of ultimately convincing the jury only when
the term "affirmative defense" is used in conjunction with explicit language shift-
ing the burden of persuasion to the defendant.
Having thus defined "defense" and "affirmative defense," the drafters of the
Model Penal Code use the terms frequently throughout the specific provisions of
the model code. Article 223, "Theft and Related Offenses," provides an example.
In the course of defining eight offenses, the article recognizes three affirmative
defenses applicable to all eight offenses, as well as two other specially relevant
affirmative defenses. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 223.0-.9 (Official Draft, 1962).
21 Comparison of the theft provisions of the model code, see note 20supra, with
the theft provisions in the proposed code, WEST VmGIIA C MINAL CODE, supra note
1, §§ 61-7-2 to -13, discloses great similarity between the two codes. The proposed
code adopts, with minor variations in language, two of the three generally applica-
ble affirmative defenses and both of the specially applicable affirmative defenses.
The proposed code adds to the model code by creating two new theft offenses and
one new affirmative defense. Id.
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doubt12 the nonexistence of any defense raised by the defendant,2
the defendant who raises an affirmative defense "has the burden
of establishing such defense to the satisfaction of the court or jury,
as the case may be. '2 Thus, use of the terms "defense" and
"affirmative defense" in the proposed code produces consequences
radically different from those resulting when the same terms are
used in the Model Penal Code. If the proposed West Virginia Crim-
inal Code speaks of a "defense," the burden of production is on the
defendant,2 but the prosecutor has the burden of persuasion with
regard to that defense. 2 If the proposed code employs the term
"affirmative defense," then both the burden of production and the
burden of persuasion are on the defendant.Y
The drafters' failure to see the consequences of so defining
"defense" and "affirmative defense" in the proposed code results
in giving the defendant the burden of proving, to the satisfaction
of the jury, a number of excusing or justifying facts which ordinar-
ily the prosecution has the burden of disproving beyond a reason-
able doubt. The theft provisions of the proposed code,2 for exam-
ple, recognize claim of right as an affirmative defense. 9 Because
the defense is affirmative, the defendant must establish his claim
of right to the satisfaction of the jury. Under the present West
Virginia criminal statutes, 30 a claim of right contradicts an essen-
tial element of the offense, intent to deprive the owner of the bene-
fits of ownership; 31 accordingly, West Virginia prosecutors must
2 Id. § 61-1-4(a).
2 Under the proposed code, the defendant bears the burden of first introducing
evidence with regard to any defense, whether affirmative or not. Id. §§ 61-1-4(a),
-4(b).
24 Id. § 61-1-4(c).
Id. § 61-1-4(b).
, These are the same consequences which result from use of the term
"affirmative defense" in the Model Penal Code. See note 20 supra.
1 Under the Model Penal Code, these consequences flow only from use of the
term "affirmative defense" coupled with clear language shifting the burden of
persuasion to the defendant. See note 20 supra.
WEST VMGINIA CRIUNAL CODE, supra note 1, §§ 61-7-2 to -13.
• Id. The language of the claim-of-right section closely parallels the Model
Penal Code, MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1(3) (Official Draft, 1962), but the model
code does not shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant as the proposed code
does.
20 W. VA. CODE §§ 61-3-13, -20, -24 (1977) (larceny, embezzlement, false pre-
tenses).
" Crow v. Coiner, 323 F. Supp. 555 (N.D.W. Va. 1971) (larceny); State v.
Riley, 151 W. Va. 364, 151 S.E.2d 308 (1966) (embezzlement); State v. Pishner, 72
W. Va. 603, 78 S.E. 752 (1913) (false pretenses).
[Vol. 80
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currently disprove claim of right beyond a reasonable doubt.32
The burglary provisions33 provide another example of the pen-
chant in the proposed code for shifting the burden of persuasion
to the defendant. These provisions establish that it is an affirma-
tive defense to any burglary or criminal trespass prosecution that
the dwelling or building entered was an abandoned structure.34
Since the defense is labeled an affirmative one, the defendant must
persuade the jury that the structure was abandoned. At present
the prosecutor must disprove abandonment beyond a reasonable
doubt."
The theft and burglary provisions are but two examples36 of
the results of the definitions of defense and affirmative defense in
the proposed code. These results-shifting the ultimate burden of
persuasion to the defendant on a host of issues-can be condemned
not only as unwise but also, probably, as unconstitutional.
In the last decade the United States Supreme Court has set
constitutional guidelines regarding the burden of persuasion in
criminal cases. In 1970 the Court held that the prosecution must
1 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); State v. Pendry, 227 S.E.2d 210 (W. Va.
1976).
0 WEST VIRGINIA CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 1, §§ 61-6-14 to -24.
' Id. §§ 61-6-19(b), -23(1). The wording of these affirmative defenses matches
closely the provisions of the Model Penal Code regarding abandonment, MODEL
PENAL CODE §§ 221.1(1), .2(3) (Official Draft, 1962), but the Model Penal Code does
not shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant.
1 State v. Pendry, 227 S.E.2d 210 (W. Va. 1976); State v. Bair, 112 W. Va.
655, 166 S.E. 369 (1932); W. VA. CODE § 61-3-11 (1977).
11 A few other provisions of the pr9posed criminal code shift the burden of
persuasion to the defendant with regard to essential elements of the offense. WEsT
VIRGINIA CFJK[NAL CODE, supra note 1, § 61-5-42 (rape: mistake as to consent be-
cause of victim's youth); id. § 61-7-9(b) (credit card abuse: intention to meet all
obligations arising out of use of card); id. § 61-8-25(b) (falsifying business records:
mere execution of the orders of a superior without intent to defraud).
Several other provisions recognize affirmative defenses not directly related to
essential elements of the offense. Id. § 61-5-29(b) (criminal coercion); id. § 61-7-
7(b) (theft by extortion); id. § 61-7.8(b) (unauthorized use of vehicles); id. § 61-8-
28 (commercial bribery and receiving a commercial bribe); id. § 61-9-33 (hindering
prosecution or apprehension); id. § 61-10-32(c) (second-degree unlawful possession
of a deadly weapon); id. § 61-10-33(c) (carrying a dangerous weapon); id. § 61-10-
44(a) (unlawful possession of prohibited weapon or ordnance). Three of these eight
affirmative defenses also appear in the Model Penal Code, MODEL PENAL CODE §§
212.5(1), 223.4, .9 (Official Draft, 1962) (criminal coercion, theft by extortion, unau-
thorized use of vehicles), but none of the three Model Penal Code provisions shifts
the burden of persuation to the defendant, id.
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prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt because any less strin-
gent standard would deny the defendant due process of law." In
1975 the Supreme Court specifically required proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt of every element of the offense charged. 8 Although
this rule leaves the legislature free to redefine the elements of any
particular offense and to shift to the defendant some burdens of
persuasion (by converting former elements of an offense into af-
firmative defenses which the defendant must prove)," the Su-
preme Court has recognized that there are limits on the power to
redistribute burdens of persuasion. "[I]t is not within the prov-
ince of a legislature to declare an individual guilty or presump-
tively guilty of a crime";4" to transform an offense with five ele-
ments into an offense with one element and four affirmative defen-
ses is tantamount to creating a presumption of guilt. Indeed, it is
possible that a legislature may not convert even one former ele-
ment of an offense into an affirmative defense, with respect to
17 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Winship, a juvenile, had been adjudi-
cated a delinquent by a preponderance of the evidence. In reversing this adjudica-
tion, the Court first held that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard was re-
quired in criminal trials and then reasoned that due process required application
of the same standard in juvenile proceedings involving allegations of criminal be-
havior.
3 Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). A Maine jury had found Wilbur
guilty of murder pursuant to instructions that the prosecution had the burden of
proving an intentional killing beyond a reasonable doubt but that the defendant
had the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that his intentional
killing was the result of sudden provocation and was, therefore, not murder but
manslaughter. The opinion of the Court concluded that since malice aforethought
(in this case, lack of sudden provocation) was an element of the offense of murder,
under In re Winship that element must be proved by the prosecution beyond a
reasonable doubt. See note 37 supra.
2 For example, despite its holdings in In re Winship and Mullaney V. Wilbur,
see notes 37-38 supra, the United States Supreme Court has upheld a murder
conviction based upon New York statutes which define murder as intentionally
causing the death of another but give the defendant an opportunity to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that he acted under extreme emotional disturbance,
which showing reduces the crime from murder to manslaughter. Patterson v. New
York, 97 S. Ct. 2319 (1977). The Patterson majority distinguished Mullaney v.
Wilbur by noting that New York, unlike Maine, defines murder without reference
to malice aforethought; therefore, lack of extreme emotional disturbance is not an
element of the offense of murder in New York and need not be proved by the
prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. For a discussion of the restrictions on
legislative circumvention of In re Winship and Mullaney v. Wilbur, see text accom-
panying notes 40-41 infra.
11 Patterson v. New York, 97 S. Ct. 2319, 2327 (1977), quoting McFarland v.
American Sugar Refining Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86 (1916).
[Vol. 80
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which the defendant has the burden of persuasion, unless some
quid pro quo is offered the defendant-such as a broadening of the
affirmative defense so that it excuses conduct not excused under
the former definition of the crime.4
The constitutional requirements to which a legislature must
adhere when it shifts burdens of persuasion to the criminal defen-
dant are not clear. Every time the legislature makes such a shift,
however, criminal defendants will be able to mount at least color-
able claims that the shift violates their constitutional right. Even
if most of these claims are ultimately found to be without merit,
their consideration will inevitably consume valuable court time.
And, just as inevitably, some of these claims will have merit and
result in the voiding of the criminal statutes involved.
Those provisions of article 1 of the proposed code dealing with
burdens of production and persuasion thus fail to keep the promise
of codification: they will nbt help to clarify the criminal law. Those
provisions, however, are not the only defective ones in that article.
Others, especially those dealing with the use of inferences against
the criminal defendant, are drafted so carelessly that they verge
on unconstitutionality.
Article 1 of the proposed West Virginia Criminal Code recog-
nizes that inferences may be used against the defendant and pro-
vides general rules for the use of any of the inferences established
by specific provisions: (1) if there is evidence of the facts giving rise
to the inference, the court must submit the issue to the jury, unless
"the evidence as a whole clearly negatives the inferred facts"; 2 and
(2) if the issue is submitted to the jury, the court must inform the
jurors that "while the inferred fact must. . . be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, . . . the jury may regard the facts giving rise to
the inference as sufficient evidence of the inferred fact. '4 3 Applying
either of these rules could violate a defendant's constitutional
rights. Although both rules are taken almost word for word from
1 Support for this requirement of a quid pro quo can be found in the opinion
of the court in Patterson v. New York. See note 39 supra. The Patterson Court
emphasized that New York's extreme emotional disturbance affirmative defense is
a "substantially expanded version of the older heat of passion concept," 97 S. Ct.
at 2325, thus casting doubt on the notion that a statute which converted heat-of-
passion into an affirmative defense without broadening its scope would pass consti-
tutional muster.
42 WEST VIMGNIA CIUMINAL CODE, supra note 1, § 61-1-4(e)(1).
, Id. § 61-1-4(e)(2).
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the Model Penal Code," developments since the publication of the
model code in 1962 have rendered its provisions regarding infer-
ences, and all similar statutes, constitutionally suspect.
The defect in the first rule is its restriction of a court's power
to disregard an inference when the connection between the proved
fact and the inferred fact is tenuous; unless that connection is
"clearly negative[d]," the issue must be submitted to the jury.
Although this provision met the constitutional requirements of
1962,11 in the years since the adoption of the Model Penal Code the
Supreme Court has steadily raised the standard by which it judges
the constitutional validity of criminal inferences." Today, due pro-
cess would require that the proved fact establish the inferred fact
beyond a reasonable doubt.? By requiring submission to the jury
even when the proved fact leaves a reasonable doubt as to the
existence of the inferred fact, the proposed code could force trial
judges to commit constitutional error.
For example, in defining the crime of receiving stolen prop-
erty, the proposed code identifies knowledge or belief that the re-
ceived property has been stolen as an element of the offense."
Knowledge or belief can be inferred under certain conditions: if the
defendant is a dealer found in possession of property stolen from
different people on different occasions, or if as dealer he has re-
ceived stolen property more than once in the previous year, or if
as a dealer in property of the sort received he has paid a price
substantially below the normal value of the property.' Proof of
either of the first two conditions could well leave a reasonable
doubt as to the defendant's knowledge or belief that the received
property was stolen,50 but despite this possibility, under the pro-
" MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(5) (Official Draft, 1962).
5 In Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943), the United States Supreme
Court held that due process required only a rational connection between the proved
fact and the inferred fact.
11 See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970); Leary v. United States,
395 U.S. 6 (1969); United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965).
"7 E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF EvIDENCE, § 344, at 816
(2nd ed. 1972), citing Turner v. United States, supra note 46, and In re Winship,
supra note 37.
WFsr VIRGINIA CRmINNAL CODE, supra note 1, § 61-7-10(a).
,' Id. § 61-7-10(b).
The prosecution's proof may show only that the defendant, a dealer, pur-
chased property from a thief who was disposing of the gains from more than one
theft. This would establish the first condition giving rise to the inference. Or, the
prosecutor may prove only that the defendant, a dealer, has twice purchased stolen
[Vol. 80
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posed code the issue of knowledge or belief must be submitted to
the jury (unless the evidence as a whole clearly negates the infer-
ence). A trial judge must choose, then, either to ignore the criminal
code by not submitting the issue to the jury or to violate the Con-
stitution by allowing the jury to decide the question.51
The defect in the second rule is its requirement that the judge
inform the jury of the existence of the inference, thus arguably
decreasing the prosecutor's burden of persuasion. Even though the
rule also requires a reminder that the prosecution must prove its
case beyond a reasonable doubt, informing the jury of the legally
recognized relationship between the proved fact and the inferred
fact could easily sway a juror who would otherwise have had a
reasonable doubt. Therefore, instructing the jury about the infer-
ence unconstitutionally reduces the prosecutor's burden of persua-
sion, 5 2 notwithstanding any accompanying curative instruction. "
Although the validity of this constitutional argument is dis-
property from a certain thief within the past year. This would be enough to trigger
the second inference.
1, Other provisions of the proposed West Virginia Criminal Code could present
the state trial judges with similar dilemmas. WEST VIRGINIA CRIMINAL CODE, supra
note 1, § 61-7-6(c)(2) (theft by failure to make required disposition of property
received: dealing with property as one's own inferred from failure to account after
demand); id. § 61-7-11(b) (obscuring the identity of a machine: knowledge of de-
facement inferred from possession for sale in the course of business); id. § 61-7-
12(a)(2) (theft offenses: knowledge that check would be dishonored inferred from
insufficient funds both at time of check's issuance and at time of check's presenta-
tion); id. § 61-11-19(a) (gambling offenses: knowledge of character of device or
records inferred from possession); id. § 61-11-29 (promoting prostitution in the third
degree: knowledge of profit from prostitution inferred from receipt of support from
prostitution); id. § 61-11-34 (pornography offenses: knowledge of character of mate-
rial inferred from possession).
A peculiar problem arises under the proposed murder provision. That provision
abandons the felony-murder doctrine and substitutes for it an inference of reckless-
ness under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life. Id. § 61-
5-2(b). In other words, rather than producing a conclusive presumption of malice
aforethought, proof of commission of a felony generates only the inference of malice,
an inference which the defendant may rebut. Surprisingly this inference may be
vulnerable to the constitutional attack outlined above, even though there is wide-
spread agreement that the conclusive presumption of the traditional felony-murder
doctrine, which has far harsher effects on the defendant, is constitutional. Cf.
United States v. Antelope, 97 S. Ct. 1395 (1977).
2 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
5 This argument is approved in State v. Evans, 28 Md. App. 640, 349 A.2d 300,
(1975) (Moylan, J.), aff'd, 278 Md. 197, 362 A.2d 629 (1976). But see cases cited
note 54 infra.
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puted,4 recent opinions suggest that the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals might look upon the argument with favor. Since
1975 the supreme court of appeals has three times struck down
inferences55 used against criminal defendants,56 each time citing
the diminishing of the prosecutor's burden of persuasion as one of
its reasons. Only one of these cases involved jury instructions. 7 In
spite of the apparent existence of a general instruction on the
prosecution's burden of proving every element of the offense be-
yond a reasonable doubt,5" the court threw out an instruction
which informed the jury of the inference in question. Thus, the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals appears likely to hold
that a prosecutor may use an inference to get an issue to the jury,
but he may not also have the jury instructed about the legal status
of that inference because such an instruction inevitably lessens his
burden of persuasion.
Although the defect in the first rule casts doubt on the consti-
tutionality of some of the inferences created by the proposed
1, United States ex rel. Wilson v. Essex County Ct., 406 F. Supp. 991 (D.N.J.
1976). Compare United States ex rel. Castro v. Regan, 525 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1975)
with State v. Evans, 28 Md. App. 640, 349 A.2d 300 (1975).
" The court in State v. Pendry, 227 S.E.2d 210 (W. Va. 1976), held that the
state is not entitled by way of a presumption or inference to avoid the proof of an
element beyond a reasonable doubt. (Although there may be a technical distinction
between an inference and a presumption, the terms are often used interchangeably
in West Virginia. Id. at 224.)
56 State ex rel. Cogar v. Kidd, 234 S.E.2d 899 (W. Va. 1977) (embezzlement:
appropriation of entrusted property may not be inferred from failure to produce
property after demand for its production); State v. Pendry, 227 S.E.2d 210 (W. Va.
1976) (murder: intent to kill may not be inferred from deliberate use of a deadly
weapon); Pinkerton v. Farr, 220 S.E.2d 682 (W. Va. 1975) (conspiracy: intent to
conspire may not be inferred from aiding and abetting).
31 State v. Pendry, 227 S.E.2d 210 (W. Va. 1976). Both State ex rel. Cogar v.
Kidd, 234 S.E.2d 899 (W. Va. 1977) and Pinkerton v. Farr, 220 S.E.2d 682 (W. Va.
1975) involved defendants seeking writs of prohibition against prosecutions which
had not yet gone to trial.
- State v. Pendry, 227 S.E.2d at 223. The court specifically disapproved of any
instruction which "would entitle the jury to accept proof of the use of the deadly
weapon as being proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the [element] of intent . ...
A[n inference] cannot relieve the State of proving [the] elements [of an offense]
beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. Two other grounds for disapproving the instruction
on the deadly weapon inference were offered: the instruction phrased the inference
incorrectly and also appeared to place the ultimate burden of persuasion on the
defendant. Id. The opinion of the court did not consider the general validity of
inferring intent to kill from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon. See text accom-
panying notes 44-51 supra.
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code, 59 the defect in the second rule calls all such inferences into
question." By requiring trial courts to instruct juries that these
various inferences have legal force, the proposed code again forces
the courts into a Hobson's choice between ignoring the code provi-
sions and violating the Constitution.
In their present form the general provisions of the proposed
code fail to achieve the primary goal of codification-rationalizing
the criminal law. Although the mens rea provisions of article 2
represent progress toward that goal, other provisions in the same
article negate the advance. More disappointing is the inadequacy
of provisions in article 1 regarding defenses, affirmative defenses,
and the use of inferences; through misapplication of the Model
Penal Code and misreading of recent constitutional law, the draf-
ters of those provisions have produced more confusion, not less.
Tested by examination of its general provisions, the present ver-
sion of the proposed West Virginia Criminal Code is found wanting
and does not merit adoption.
II. SPECIFIC PROVISIONS
The preceding discussion has been devoted to analysis of the
general provisions of the proposed code because these provisions
are frequently overlooked in the rush to examine the provisions
establishing specific crimes. Not surprisingly, the latter examina-
tion yields as negative a result as does the analysis of the general
provisions.
The articles of the proposed code which define specific offen-
sesa' are deficient both individually and as a whole: many of the
specific provisions are so imprecise in their language as to raise
problems of vagueness and overbreadth; furthermore, too many
offenses are created. These two features combine to make the pro-
posed code a bonanza for law-enforcement officials and a setback
for the civil liberties of the citizenry.
Many specific provisions of the proposed code define crimes
' See note 51 supra.
In addition to those cited in note 51 supra, the following specific provisions
of the proposed West Virginia Criminal Code create inferences: WEST VIRGINIA
CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 1, § 61-7-5(b) (theft of services: deception as to intent
to pay may be inferred from absconding from payment); id. § 61-7-15 (shoplifting:
intent to steal may be inferred from knowing concealment of merchandise); id. §
61-9-40 (perjury and false swearing: falsity of one statement may be inferred from
two inconsistent statements).
11 See note 4 supra.
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too broadly apparently in order to insure that certain acts which
should be criminal are not legalized by language which is too spe-
cific. The offense of possessing a weapon while intoxicated," for
example, incorporates the general definition of intoxication:" "a
disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting from the
introduction of substances into the body." 4 Although it is desira-
ble to avoid specifying only certain drugs as intoxicants, thereby
excluding newly formulated chemical compounds which are
equally as dangerous, it is not wise to make the definition so broad
as to include all "substances" which "disturb" mental or physical
"capacities." The legislature has already confronted the problem
of defining illegal drugs and has made a comprehensive statement
in the Controlled Substances Act" without including persons
under the influence of aspirin, one beer, insulin, or a blood thin-
ning drug, as does this proposed section.6
The crime riot in the first degree, for another example, is
defined as "participat[ing] with five or more persons in tumul-
tuous and violent conduct and thereby intentionally or recklessly
creat[ing] a grave risk of causing public alarm."" An additional
requirement for first-degree rioting is that "a person other than one
of the participants suffer bodily injury or substantial property
2 WEST VIRGINIA CRIMINAL CODE § 61-10-34.
'3 Id. § 61-10-27(15).
Id. § 61-2-1(2).
'3 W. VA. CODE §§ 60A-1-101 to -6-605 (1977 Replacement Vol.).
The proposed code does provide one means of avoiding this type of convic-
tion in its provision relating to de minimis infractions. WEST VIRGINIA CRIMINAL
CODE, supra note 1, § 61-2-11. This section provides that the court should dismiss
the prosecution if the defendant's conduct "[d]id not actually cause or threaten
the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense or did so
only to an extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction" or if
defendant's conduct "[piresents such other extenuations that it cannot reasonably
be regarded as envisaged by the Legislature in forbidding the offense." Id. § 61-2-
11I(a) (2) -(3).
Courts will have difficulty in determining what can and "cannot reasonably be
regarded as envisaged by the Legislature" because the proposed code itself lacks
any statement of purpose for each section or group of sections and because the
legislative history of acts passed by the West Virginia Legislature is not recorded.
Consequently, courts must rely on the written opinions of the supreme court of
appeals and the less accessible opinions of the circuit courts to obtain a full descrip-
tion of the elements of the offense and defenses. The ironic result is that in this
instance proposed codification will only perpetuate the problems associated with
the common law of crimes.
"7 Id. § 61-10-2(a)(1).
[Vol. 80
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damage [occur]." 8 In defining this felony for which one may serve
from one to five years in prison,69 the use of vague terms like "tu-
multuous and violent conduct" and "public alarm" is unaccept-
able. Although the statute is well suited for dealing with an orga-
nized band of terrorists, it is not appropriate for, but would en-
compass, five fraternity brothers at a football game who become
rowdy and in the process accidentally break someone's three-
hundred-dollar watch or split someone's lip. The provision would
also penalize those who might panic during a natural disaster and
cause someone else to be harmed or to lose some of his property. 0
Although similar instances of overbreadth appear throughout
the proposed code,' they are most plentiful in article 10, "Offenses
Against Public Order." In addition to the overbreadth in its treat-
ment of first-degree riot, article 10 provides imprecise definitions
for second-degree riot, inciting to riot, and unlawful assembly;72
indeed vagueness becomes almost a motif in the provisions dealing
with disorderly conduct,7 3 harassment, 7 harassing communica-
tions,75 obstructing a highway,76 and disrupting meetings.77
Id. § 61-10-2(a)(2).
" Id. §§ 61-10-2(b), -12-9(a)(4).
To The drafters of this section would have been well advised to follow the Model
Penal Code in its definition of the felony riot, which definition requires that the
accused have had either a "purpose to commit or facilitate the commission of a
felony or misdemeanor," or a "purpose to prevent or coerce official action," or
"knowledge [that a participant] plan[ned] to use a firearm or other deadly
weapon." MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.1(1) (Official Draft, 1962). The omission of
these additional mental requirements in the proposed West Virginia Criminal Code
does not aid in the prosecution of the intentional rioter. Such an omission does,
however, permit the felony prosecution of countless persons who, without criminal
purpose or knowledge, may have been in the wrong place at the wrong time.
"1 See, e.g., WEST VIRGINIA CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 1, §§ 61-5-39, -40 (inde-
cent exposure and public indecency: penalizing actions which "affront or alarm"
without further definition), § 61-9-6(a) (5) (falsely reporting an incident: penalizing
conduct "likely to cause public inconvenience or alarm" without further definition).
72 Id. § 61-10-3(a), -4(a), -5(a) ("tumultuous and violent conduct," "grave
risk of causing public alarm").
11 Id. § 61-10-6(a) ("violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior,"
"unreasonable noise," "offensively coarse utterance, gesture or display,"
"hazardous or physically offensive condition [created] by any act that serves no
legitimate purpose").
11 Id. § 61-10-7(a) ("offensively coarse utterance, gesture or display," "acts
which alarm or seriously annoy ... which serve no legitimate purpose").
11 Id. § 61-10-8(a) ("offensively coarse language likely to cause annoyance or
alarm," "no purpose of legitimate communication").
" Id. § 61-10-14(a) ("renders any highway. . . impassable without unreason-
able inconvenience or hazard").
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Provisions like these not only allow the innocent to be con-
victed, but also permit the law-abiding to be harassed. Dissidents
of every sort-social, political, and economic-object to the
"public order"; vaguely defined offenses against that order provide
a fertile field for abuse of the dissidents' civil rights.
Potential for abuse springs from other sources as well. Be-
cause the sanctions imposed are usually minor, there will be few
appeals from convictions, even from improper ones. Furthermore,
these broadly defined offenses can be used for abusive purposes
even if no conviction is sought, because the police will be able to
remove a person from the site of his dissent-for example, a picket
line-with at least the appearance of legitimacy. Because the
abuse has been cloaked in legitimacy, the person arrested has a
difficult time making his case if he chooses to bring a civil action
against the offending officer. 78 Consequently, these offenses against
public order promise to become personal vendetta laws for prose-
cutors and police officers much as the current peace bond statute
is. 79
Adoption of these overbroad provisions is surely impolitic and
misguided since courts may subsequently be forced to strike them
down for being unconstitutionally vague.8" Striking down the pro-
visions would eliminate the problem of convicting innocent persons
and the problem of abuse, but it would also prevent the conviction
of those whose actions the state may legitimately prohibit-the
intentional rioter or disruptor of meetings. These persons, whose
actions are clearly criminal, would nonetheless have standing to
attack the constitutionality of a vague statute."' Society pays too
high a price for a statute under which innocent persons may be
convicted and which may later be set aside, preventing the convic-
tion of those who should suffer penal sanctions. This is particularly
true when a more carefully drawn and specifically worded statute
could have been used from the outset to avoid these problems.
77 Id. § 61-10-15(a) ("any utterance, gesture or display designed to outrage the
sensibilities of the group").
8 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (Good-faith belief that statute being
enforced is constitutional provides complete defense to action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.).
"' W. VA. CODE § 62-10-1 to -4 (1977). See also Note, Peace Bond-A Question-
able Procedure for a Legitimate State Interest, 74 W. VA. L. REv. 326 (1972).
W Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
For a particularly egregious example, see Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.
3d 619, 470 P.2d 617 (1970), where the defendant, who had kneed a pregnant woman
and fractured the skull of her subsequently stillborn child, was held not guilty of
killing a "human being."
[Vol. 80
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Although imprecision in drafting is a major defect of the spe-
cific provisions, it is not so important as the problem of overdraft-
ing. The proposed West Virginia Criminal Code creates too many
crimes and thus makes life a little too easy for West Virginia prose-
cutors. The proposed code, once again in an apparent effort to
provide flexibility, sets out so many different crimes and different
degrees for each crime that a single act or course of conduct by a
defendant may subject him to excessive prosecution and punish-
ment.
For example, a prankster who is arrested after the "cherry
bomb" he placed in the toilet facilities of a fast-food restaurant
exploded, could be charged with: reckless endangerment in the
first degree (a class D felony)8" or in the second degree (a class A
misdemeanor);83 criminal mischief in the first degree (a class D
felony),84 in the second degree (a class A misdemeanor),85 or in the
third degree (a class B misdemeanor);8 use of a noxious substance
(a class A misdemeanor);87 criminal possession of a noxious sub-
stance (a class B misdemeanor);"s unlawful possession of dangerous
ordnance in the first degree (a class C felony),89 in the second
degree (a class D felony),"0 or in the third degree (a class A misde-
meanor);9 arson in the first degree (a class B felony),92 in the
second degree (a class C felony),93 or in the third degree (a class D
felony) ;94 disorderly conduct (a violation);5 and harassment (a vio-
lation) ."
As a result of his prank the defendant may find himself
charged with a class B felony (first degree arson, punishable by a
maximum of twenty years in prison), 7 a class C felony (unlawful
R2 WEST VIRGINIA CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 1, § 61-5-18.
- Id. § 61-5-19.
84 Id. § 61-6-9.
Id. § 61-6-10.
As Id. § 61-6-11.
87 Id. § 61-6-12.
' Id. § 61-6-13.
A' Id. § 61-10-28.
90 Id. § 61-10-29.
91 Id. § 61-10-30.
92 Id. § 61-6-2.
93 Id. § 61-6-3.
14 Id. § 61-6-4.
95 Id. § 61-10-6.
,5 Id. § 61-10-7.
'5 Id. § 61-12-9(a).
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possession of dangerous ordnance, punishable by a maximum of
ten years in prison),9" two class D felonies (reckless endangerment
and criminal mischief, each punishable by a maximum of five
years in prison),99 a class A misdemeanor (use of a noxious sub-
stance, punishable by a maximum of one year in jail),10 a class B
misdemeanor (criminal possession of a noxious substance, punish-
able by a maximum of 90 days in jail),"0' and two violations (disor-
derly conduct and harassment, each punishable by fines).*' Addi-
tionally, the terms could be set to run consecutively.'03
One of the ramifications of the prosecutor's access to such a
"laundry list" of charges is that he has good reason to "overcharge"
for each criminal act. In the above hypothetical, where the pranks-
ter is charged with, among other counts, a class B felony (arson in
the first degree), there is a strong incentive for him to enter into a
plea-bargaining agreement in order to plead guilty to a class A
misdemeanor or even a class D felony, if necessary. Confronting a
defendant with a long list of "good" charges will undoubtedly
cause plea bargaining to look attractive, and other considerations
will enhance the desirability of plea bargaining even further. Al-
though a defendant may not be convicted of two or more offenses
if the one is a lesser offense included within another, under the
proposed code he may be tried on all applicable charges, whether
included or not.'0 4 Thus, the prosecutor may present a multitude
of offenses to the jury.
Two results occur, both of which illustrate the value to the
prosecutor of "overcharging." First, if the prosecutor just tries to
prove the most serious charge against the defendant and carries
the other charges as security, his chances of proving that one seri-
ous offense are increased because he need concentrate on proving
only one offense whereas the defendant must try to raise a reasona-
ble doubt about all of the charges. Second, there are psychological
advantages in presenting a jury with a long list of possible offenses.
Jurors may determine that if the defendant is charged with all of
these offenses, he must be guilty of something; or a jury divided
I !d.
I Id.
'0 Id. § 61-12-9(b).
Id.
Id. § 61-12-24(a).
,o1 Id. § 61-12-14(a).
101 Id. § 61-3-17.
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over the primary issue of guilt or innocence may resolve the prob-
lem by convicting the defendant of one of the lesser charges.
These benefits are increased by the greater number of offenses
and degrees of offenses provided for in the proposed code 1 5 and by
the problem of imprecise description.' Because of the number of
charges which can be brought against a defendant and because of
the advantages provided to the prosecution by a multiplicity of
charges, more and more cases will be resolved through plea bar-
gaining. 7 Although the merits of plea bargaining are beyond the
scope of this article,08 it is contended here that when plea bargain-
ing increases because of the. danger that convictions will be based
on insufficient evidence or on jury compromise, then any proposal
which increases that danger should come under serious scrutiny
before it is adopted.
IV. CONCLUSION
The specific provisions of the proposed code, like the general
"o5 The proposed West Virginia Criminal Code creates 206 separate offenses,
156 of the first degree, 37 of the second degree, and 13 of the third degree.
1 See text accompanying notes 62-77 supra.
,o The only feature of the proposed code which might make plea bargaining
less attractive is the potential for leniency inherent in the sentencing provisions.
Using the stated purposes of the criminal code-"[t]o insure the public safety by
preventing the commission of offenses through the deterrent influence of the sent-
ences authorized, the rehabilitation of those convicted, and their confinement when
required in the interest of public protection," WEST VIRGINIA CRIMINAL CODE, supra
note 1, § 61-1-6(5)-and combining this with the evidence unearthed by the pre-
sentence report required in every felony case, id. § 61-12-5, a defense attorney can
argue that his client's situation in life requires a penalty less severe than incarcera-
tion. Even if the crime of which the defendant has been convicted imposes a prison
term, the court, in consideration of these factors, can order the lesser penalty of
probation. Id. §§ 61-12-16, -17. If the facts of the case indicate that the deterrent
value of the criminal law will not be significantly diminished, then the defendant
should not be incarcerated if imprisonment will not enhance his chances for rehabil-
itation and if he poses no significant threat when allowed to remain in the main-
stream of society. This balancing of interests means that incarceration should be
ordered only when it is necessary. Such a mandate is similar to the requirement of
using the least restrictive alternative which the West Virginia Legislature has im-
posed upon proceedings for commitment of the mentally ill. W. VA. CODE § 27-5-
4(d) (1976 Replacement Vol.). It must be noted, however, that these statutory
provisions will mean little if they remain only perfunctory admonitions written in
a code book and are seldom given serious consideration by sentencing judges.
113 Compare ABA STANDARDS, PLEAS OF GUILTY § 1.8 (Approved Draft, 1968)
with NATIONAL ADvISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS,
COURTS § 3.1 (1973).
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provisions, display its overall weaknesses. While codification may
be necessary for a complete renovation of West Virginia's "castle"
of criminal law, if that renovation compromises the constitutional
rights of individuals by way of misstated burdens of proof, overcri-
minalization, and statutes which invite official abuse, then per-
haps the renovation comes at too high a cost and different plans
should be studied before the reconstruction begins.
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